From Legacy to Luggage 2.0: How VIP, Safari, and D2C Brands are Shaping India’s Luggage Market?

Once limited to bulky plastic shells and one-size-fits-all utility, India’s luggage market is now in motion—literally and metaphorically. As Indians travel more than ever, be it for business, weddings, spiritual retreats, or revenge tourism, the humble suitcase has become a style statement, a status symbol, and a companion of aspiration.

Valued at under ₹50,000 crore, the luggage industry in India is still largely unorganised, with formal players accounting for just about a quarter of the market. And yet, within this branded segment, three names - VIP Industries, Samsonite, and Safari—control a staggering 90% share.

With GST reforms favouring formalisation and consumer tastes shifting from function to fashion, the sector is undergoing a deep structural churn.

In this blog, we unpack the evolution of India’s luggage market through the journeys of its two biggest legacy players—VIP Industries and Safari Industries—and the rising tide of D2C disruptors.

For better insights, tune into our recent podcast featuring our Research Analyst, Rahul Dani, who breaks down the strategies, stumbles, and surprises reshaping the industry.

VIP Industries: A Legacy Brand with Manufacturing DNA

VIP Industries is the biggest brand in the luggage industry in India. Founded in 1971 by Dilip Piramal, VIP Industries has long been a household name synonymous with travel in India. It owns an impressive portfolio of brands including VIP, Skybags, Aristocrat, Alfa, and Carlton, catering to a wide range of customer segments.

VIP was the first Indian luggage brand, capitalising on a closed economy with no foreign competition. VIP’s foundational edge was domestic manufacturing—it manufactured in-house right from the start with plants in Nashik and Nagpur.

Brand Architecture

VIP has a multi-brand portfolio, segmented by price:

• Aristocrat, Alfa – Mass segment
• VIP, Skybags – Mid-premium
• Carlton – Premium
• Caprese – Women's handbags (mid-premium)

This multi-brand portfolio helped VIP maintain the top spot in company-level revenue, but Safari’s single-brand strength is catching up in unit economics and visibility.

Manufacturing: A Double-Edged Sword

Once considered VIP’s defining moat, its long-term manufacturing strategy is now under pressure due to evolving demand patterns and geopolitical uncertainties.

In 2012–13, to reduce its dependency on China and import duties, VIP Industries made a decisive pivot: shifting a significant portion of its manufacturing to Bangladesh and India. Today, a majority of its soft luggage is sourced from Bangladesh, while the production of hard luggage is increasingly localised within India.

This was initially a masterstroke. It not only improved EBITDA margins, peaking at 18% when Bangladesh was fully operational, but also gave VIP greater control over product quality and inventory cycles.

Several factors made Bangladesh an attractive hub at the time:

• The India-Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement, enabling smoother cross-border trade.
• Lower labour costs, ideal for labour-intensive soft luggage.
• A shift in consumer preference from hard to soft luggage, aligning with Bangladesh’s manufacturing strengths.

However, this once-strategic edge is now showing cracks. Recent instability in Bangladesh, combined with a resurgence in demand for hard luggage (which is capital-intensive and harder to scale rapidly), has turned VIP’s supply chain advantage into a source of vulnerability.

Strategic Misses

• VIP was late to e-commerce. It focused heavily on general trade and couldn’t reconcile pricing parity between offline and online discounts.
• Hired the consulting firm BCG to fix e-commerce too late in the game.
• Post-GST, the unorganised market collapsed, and demand moved to organised mass-segment, catching VIP off guard.
• Frequent leadership changes, which delayed strategy alignment.

Yet, under the current leadership, there's a renewed focus on market share before margins. New retail formats, better store experiences, and ongoing digital transformation suggest VIP is trying to catch up.

The E-Commerce Shift: A Work in Progress

• Safari embraced the e-commerce shift early, turning Amazon and Flipkart into growth engines. VIP, by contrast, has been more cautious and is lagging behind.
• VIP’s D2C site and marketplace listings remain functional but lack emotional or visual appeal.
• Despite being a primarily tactile category, digital-first buying is rising, especially among Gen Z and millennials.
• E-commerce now contributes to about 20–25% of VIP’s revenue, but the brand still lags behind in agility, aesthetic innovation, and omnichannel cohesion.
• VIP’s ongoing efforts include improving listings, digital marketing, and influencer engagement.

Safari Industries: From Underdog to Disruptor

Safari is less a company and more a resurrection story. Sudhir M. Jatia left VIP Industries in 2011, took over a loss-making Safari with just 3–4% market share, and turned it into a case study in ambition and discipline. Under his leadership, Safari has transformed from a slow-moving legacy player into one of the fastest-growing luggage brands in India.

In contrast to VIP, Safari outsources almost all its manufacturing, primarily from China, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. This asset-light model has helped the company scale faster and maintain lean operations.

Brand and Market Positioning

Instead of launching multiple brands like VIP, Safari honed in on one core name and built deep equity in it. Only later did they branch into Urban Jungle and Safari Select, for the premium market.

Safari is focused on:

• Aspirational India: Affordable price points, trendy designs.
• Online Channels: Over 40% of revenue comes from e-commerce.
• Quick Turnaround: Faster go-to-market cycles due to outsourced manufacturing.

Its limited brand portfolio allows for targeted marketing and SKU rationalisation, which in turn improves inventory turns and cash flow.

Strategic Moves

Here’s what helped Safari with its rapid growth:

The Rise of D2C Disruptors: Mokobara, Nasher Miles, and More

While VIP and Safari recalibrate, Direct-to-Consumer (D2C) brands like Mokobara, Assembly, Nasher Miles, and Uppercase have changed the narrative. They brought design, storytelling, and tech to an industry that had long prioritised utility over identity.

What Sets D2C Apart?

• Online-first: No traditional retail. Start with Flipkart, Amazon, and D2C websites.
• Design-led: Trendy colours, USB charging ports, smart compartments.
• Shortened replacement cycles: From 10+ years to 2-3 years for urban travellers.
• Private equity backing: Enables aggressive discounting and marketing.

Some players are now moving offline selectively (Mokobara has 3-4 stores), realising online growth has a ceiling. As these brands mature, profitability pressures are mounting, leading to more rational pricing and selective scaling.

Can Legacy Players Fight Back?

VIP and Safari are already taking notes:

• VIP has onboarded BCG to fix e-commerce and is investing in Skybags' youth appeal.
• Safari is expanding cautiously into premium, using Urban Jungle and Safari Select.

However, legacy players face bandwidth issues. Building a D2C sub-brand from scratch isn’t easy when the core business is still in transition. That’s why future M&As or strategic investments into D2C upstarts might become more common moving forward.

Comparison Table: VIP vs Safari vs D2C Brands

The Road Ahead: Consolidation and Reinvention

In the next 2-3 years, the Indian luggage market will likely experience:

• Discounting: As D2C brands burn cash to gain market share.
• Brand Fatigue: Many new entrants will struggle to build loyalty or survive without funding.
• Strategic Pivots: D2C brands will expand offline or into adjacent categories, such as backpacks and accessories.
• Manufacturing Shifts: More players will localise to avoid geopolitical risks and import duties.

In the coming 5-6 years, analysts expect the industry to consolidate heavily. The big three, VIP, Safari, Samsonite, will likely hold the lion’s share, with one or two D2C brands joining them.